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Standfirst: 
Minimizing the adverse consequences of sea-level change presents a key societal challenge. New 
modeling is necessary to examine the implications of global policy decisions that determine future 
greenhouse gas emissions and local policies around coastal risk that influence where and how we 45 
live.   
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Main Text:  
Current and future sea-level rise and the accompanying increase in sea-level extremes 
(collectively, sea-level change) present a key challenge to coastal inhabitants and others living in 50 
destinations where retreating coastal migrants may settle over coming decades to centuries (1). 
Although the physical processes that lead to coastal inundation are crucial in triggering migration 
decisions, the key dimensions of human mobility resulting from sea-level change – the number of 
displaced people and migrants, the forms of mobility that people employ, the timing of migrations, 
their likely destinations, and the socioeconomic condition of their departures and arrivals – are 55 
largely dependent on global policy decisions that determine future greenhouse gas emissions and 
local policies around coastal risk that influence where and how we live.  
The interaction of sea-level change, various forms of human mobility, and the intervening 
influence of policy raises a number of questions whose answers could inform local planners and 
national decision makers, as well as the general population facing this challenge. Figure 1 60 
conceptually depicts the possibility space of sea-level change and human migration and the 
intervening role of policies, which may simultaneously drive a diversity of outcomes that can be 
explored and tested in models. Unprotected areas in low-elevation flood plains face a knowable 
probability of sea-level change and associated frequency of flooding, largely a product of extreme 
high tides and storm surges, similar under all emissions scenarios to the year 2050 (Fig. 1A). As 65 
sea-level change progresses, new exposure will likely drive multiple simultaneous migration 
dynamics, even as a diversity of policies act as intervening factors (Fig. 1B). By 2100, different 
emissions scenarios produce diverging sea-level change trajectories, with corresponding coastal 
risks that will likely trigger adaptation strategies, namely coastal protection, accommodation, 
and/or retreat, which may influence subsequent migration dynamics (Fig. 1C). 70 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We need to know which coastal regions migrants will leave as sea level rises, and the 
destinations toward which migration will increase. What are feasible interventions that sending 
and receiving jurisdictions can introduce to influence migration, including adaptation measures to 
protect coastlines and accommodate infrastructure, but also migration incentives such as income 75 
credits, housing subsidies, and public services in safer environments? How sensitive is migration 
induced by sea-level change to macro-level factors, such as interest rates, taxes, social services, 
and entry quotas? What are the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of future migrants, 
how do they differ from today’s migrants, and how do migrants’ policy demands differ in areas 
such as public health, education, housing and income?  80 
What makes addressing these questions particularly daunting is the lack of a historical 
analogue for the projected magnitude of sea-level change (1). New modelling can address this 
issue. Planners in local jurisdictions have long employed “top-down” spatial and economic models 
of urban growth to estimate the effect of specific regulatory, zoning or economic policies on future 
populations (2). The more-recent development of “bottom-up” models, such as agent-based 85 
models (ABMs), now allow researchers to account for factors that affect human behavioral 
responses, although these are difficult to quantify at scale, such as individuals’ aversions to 
uncertainty or attachment to birth location (3). Combining “top-down” and “bottom-up” modeling 
approaches may allow a more comprehensive means to examine the response of complex, 
emergent human dynamics, such as the effect of adaptation interventions on the coast. 90 
POLICY AS A DETERMINANT OF COASTAL MIGRATION DYNAMICS 
In its various forms, migration is a fundamental human strategy for improving livelihoods, 
wealth, and welfare, reducing household risk, and recovering from economic and environmental 
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disruptions (3). Systems of migration emerge over time within a broader political, economic, social 
and demographic context in which an environmental factor such as sea-level change may act as an 95 
intervening influence on these other contextual factors or as a direct driver of migration 
independent of these other factors (4).  
The environmental consequences of sea-level change include increasingly frequent and 
hazardous flooding, storm surges, soil and water salinization, coastal erosion, and permanent 
inundation (5, 6, 7). The decision to migrate in response to sea-level change sits along a continuum 100 
between forced and free migration (4). A range of socioeconomic impacts resulting from sea-level 
change may also trigger migration, including the destruction of infrastructure, the loss of 
livelihoods, a slow recovery of housing following disaster (8), or prospective changes in the 
expected return on coastal livelihoods or real estate investments in response to actual impacts or 
anticipated sea-level change (9).  105 
New patterns of migration triggered by sea level change could take a multitude of forms, 
such as displacement, short-distance, seasonal or permanent migration (Fig. 1B), which would 
likely fold into existing systems of migration (4, 8). For example, in agricultural societies 
undergoing industrialization and urbanization, where workers are transitioning from farm to urban 
wage labor, increasingly linking rural communities to cities, a decline in rural livelihoods due to 110 
salinization of soils and groundwater may simply accelerate existing urbanization (10). Sea-level 
triggers are more likely to influence the timing and volume of ongoing migration rather than 
produce new patterns of migration without historical precedent (4, 8).  
Policies, at local, national and international levels, applying to different populations, exert 
a strong intervening influence on migration, and will continue to do so even as sea-level change 115 
occurs (Fig 1B). Policy can impose or remove physical, legal, and bureaucratic barriers to both 
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internal and international migration (11), enhance or eliminate access to social services for 
migrants (12), or facilitate or obstruct transfers of funds for the establishment of networks that 
facilitate subsequent migration (13). Economic policies such as sectoral or regional subsidies, and 
interest-rate changes may indirectly affect labor market attractiveness to migrants, further 120 
influencing migration (14). Migrants themselves may also select destinations based on policies 
such as public services, infrastructure provisioning, tax advantages, loans or incentives.  
Public interventions aimed at adaptation to sea-level change likewise have implications for 
migration, including protecting coastal settlements, accommodating populations and the 
infrastructure they rely on to coastal hazards, and decisions to retreat from vulnerable areas (15, 125 
16).  Over time, investments in coastal adaptation could reconfigure how and when migration 
occurs (Fig. 1C). For example, new local policies in Norfolk, Virginia, USA include zoning for 
first-floor elevation of residences in flood-prone areas and incentives for developers to build new 
housing in flood-safe areas (17). Still, adaptation policies may negatively impact the attributes of 
coastal places that people value culturally and economically, affecting their willingness to migrate 130 
(18).  
Unexpected feedbacks between sea-level change, policy, and migration may also emerge. 
The availability of protective infrastructure, disaster insurance, or other social protections could 
mediate household vulnerability to sea-level change, encourage people to remain in high-risk 
areas, and alter people’s willingness to invest privately in adaptation. Due to the high social and 135 
economic costs of migration, some demographic groups, including the elderly and disabled, may 
become “trapped” in vulnerable places (18), altering demand for regular public services, such as 
primary education and healthcare. The concentration of low-mobility populations in high-risk 
locations may eventually require costly policy interventions, such as assisted evacuation and 
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resettlement. Other feedbacks may emerge in destinations far from the coastline, as migrants 140 
moving to safer locations alter job market competition, and demand for housing and public 
services.  
The relative influence of policy interventions on migration is a key source of uncertainty 
in future projections. It is particularly difficult to anticipate how policy will be employed at 
different times and across different spatial and administrative scales relative to sea-level change 145 
(19). The central issue is that in many jurisdictions, policy is beholden to short-term political 
processes where decision-makers devise and revise policy affecting migrants with a view toward 
maximizing gains and minimizing losses to their jurisdictions and political allies (20), often in the 
short-term, but with long-term implications for the treatment of migrants.   
MODELING SEA-LEVEL CHANGE AND MIGRATION  150 
Projections about future migration dynamics must address the diversity of local impacts 
from sea-level change, the heterogeneity of migrants’ decision-making across social contexts, and 
the uncertainty originating from policy alternatives. Projections of future migration are typically 
based on empirical models which use available data to quantify relationships between migration 
and other factors believed to influence location choice, such as wealth, wage differentials across 155 
locations, and exposure to risk (2, 21). In particular, regression models have been used to evaluate 
the effect of future climate hazards on migration based on historical migratory responses to 
environmental impacts (6). However these models are particularly limited for studying migratory 
responses to sea-level change due to the lack of historical exposure to expected coastal hazards, 
with the exception of places experiencing natural and anthropogenic subsidence. Moreover, past 160 
models have assumed that location choice is continuous and constant over time, even while future 
sea-level change may directly affect the habitability and productivity of many locations 
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simultaneously over time, eliminating them from the set of possible migration destinations. Models 
should therefore be able to evaluate changes in migration as sea-level migrants arrive in safer 
locations, congesting housing and labor markets, and diminishing expected quality-of-life of other 165 
migrants who may then revise location preferences. Evolving future sea-level change may 
influence migration feedbacks in more non-linear, dynamical ways than are simulated in empirical 
models. 
Equilibrium, or “top-down”, models are designed with an understanding of underlying 
structural mechanisms linking key system-level variables. These have the advantage of enabling 170 
quantitative projections of future behavior in situations where a ceteris paribus assumption is not 
expected to apply. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, for example, can be used to 
quantify direct and indirect macro-economic effects of sea-level change on housing, labor, trade, 
and other markets (22). Within CGE modeling frameworks, an exogenous shock can be introduced 
to simulate how a change in policy may affect the direct and indirect impacts of sea-level change 175 
on migration, both push and pull factors. Local and regional planners can use CGE to examine 
coastal shocks and viability of, for example, a zoning law to redirect future climate migration 
patterns from one destination to another. Thus far, however, most CGE models have largely 
focused on quantifying the impacts of climate change and/or mitigation policy and less on the role 
of adaptation (23). 180 
A third class of models involve “bottom-up” simulations of complex adaptive systems. 
Prominent in this class are ABMs which, like CGE models, allow for the investigation of the 
dynamics of migration and the transformation of these systems following policy responses. Unlike 
CGE models, however, ABMs embed more complex decision-making processes in their 
framework, permitting individual “agents” to possess differing preferences, attributes, and social 185 
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ties. Drawing on theory and empirical data, simulations are populated with agents programmed to 
reflect the real-world heterogeneity of potential migrants, making mobility decisions against future 
risk levels and policy environments. Looking across large numbers of model-level simulations, 
ABMs offer a view of the migration dynamics that may emerge, mapping out the possibility space 
of key system-level outcomes. This class of models provides a complement to data-driven 190 
parametric models (‘what has happened before’) and equilibrium modeling approaches (‘how we 
expect things to happen’) by mapping out the possibility space of ‘what could possibly happen,’ 
‘what responses to interventions appear likely,’ ‘what are the pathways that could lead to desired 
outcomes,’ and ‘what outcomes are not feasible.’  
MODELING INTERVENTION PATHWAYS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 195 
Modeling migratory responses to sea-level change first requires assumptions regarding the 
risk of exposure in the near term. Physical science models provide insights into the spatial 
distribution of such risk over time and likely adaptation options. An ABM can be used to predict 
the characteristics of future migration. Drawing on the kinds of variables typically captured by 
representative household surveys (e.g., demographics, assets, and livelihood data) and, where 200 
available, data on human decision making (e.g., preferences for time, risk, and aspects of 
livelihoods from behavioral experiments), populations of modeled agents can be calibrated to 
reflect actual population attributes and livelihood portfolios at origins and destinations. In 
particular, these modeled populations may have varied risk perceptions and sensitivities to the 
push, pull and mooring factors that tie people to place. ABMs can be programmed to dynamically 205 
simulate the probabilistic formation and loss of social network connections that confer migration 
opportunities and/or act as pull factors to new destinations (3).  
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As in the real world, policy levers in an ABM can be parameterized to shape agents’ access 
to parts of their environment, changing the costs or benefits associated with choices, or change the 
information landscape that agents participate in. ABMs have been used as virtual policy 210 
laboratories to explore the implications of various interventions on agents, such as changes to flood 
insurance uptake (24) or hard versus soft policies for coastal protection (25), coastal zoning (26), 
and communicating coastal risk (27). Each of these applications demonstrate the importance of 
individual-level heterogeneity, which matter in that push-pull feedbacks may result in non-linear, 
surprising, emergent migration outcomes.  215 
What emerges from ABM experiments are not point estimates of who will go where, and 
when; rather ABMs map out the possibility space of different outcomes (including flows and 
timings of migration). Summaries and comparisons of model outputs can inform planners and 
policymakers on migration dynamics that appear inevitable and those that can be influenced, as 
well as the policy levers that can expand option sets for potential migrants, or narrow the range of 220 
likely outcomes.   
 While past models have not always empirically parameterized key features of simulated 
agents – their livelihood alternatives, preferences and risk perceptions – advances in mobile-based, 
high-frequency data collection enable validation experiments on preferences and perceptions at 
scale for a fraction of the cost of traditional survey research (3). ABMs can also be calibrated on 225 
case studies. These empirical cases provide insights into the primary migration mechanisms to be 
prioritized in ABM specification, how outcomes such as displacement and migration to new 
destinations should be calibrated, and the possibility space for surprising dynamics that may 
emerge over time. It is worth noting that ABM specification from an empirical case of migration 
at one time and place may not be generalizable for future periods or across contexts. For example, 230 
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the experience of some small islands, i.e. slow social disintegration followed by rapid collapse 
(28), may be a useful analogue, but dynamics in expansive mainland low-elevation coastal zones 
would likely differ.  
THE PATH FORWARD 
 As a starting point, we recommend that policymakers apply these models with an emphasis 235 
on three important features. First, evaluations of emissions policies under discussion should be 
prioritized. A priority would be to quantify migration impacts with models forced by sea-level rise 
and extreme sea levels for emissions scenarios corresponding to the long-term objectives of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial 
levels (29), as well as more  pessimistic scenarios (e.g., RCP8.5), for outcomes at mid-21st century, 240 
2100 and beyond (30). Required sea-level data for these scenarios are available at hundreds of 
locations globally (30).  
Second, with the recognition that a major obstacle to effective climate adaptation is 
governance failure, in industrialized as well as developing countries, models should simulate 
migration outcomes for distinct policies that influence individual- and group-level capacity to 245 
adapt. This includes policies affecting the general socioeconomic conditions at local and national 
levels that provide the context for adaptive responses.  
Third, analyses should focus on time scales that more closely align with policy processes. 
Scientists often emphasize the importance of climate and sea-level change projected for 2100 and 
beyond, with such projections being sensitive to emission scenarios and assumptions about 250 
Antarctic ice-sheet physics (1, 29). In the interim, social science models should first concentrate 
on predicting the migration effects from sea-level change in 2050 when global mean sea-level rise 
is similar under different emission scenarios (1, 29) (Fig. 1A, B). In the second half of this century 
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and beyond, projections of sea-level change increasingly diverge (1, 29, 30). As we approach this 
mid-century mark, we should have a better understanding of the emissions and sea-level 255 
trajectories the world will follow for the remainder of the 21st century and beyond, and thus be in 
a better position to account for adaptation interventions and migration in that more-distant future 
(Fig. 1C).  
In all cases, representing the feedbacks of policy, population and sea level will be 
imperative as we build comprehensive models capable of guiding policy. These refinements hinge 260 
on the convergence of international organizations, governments, advocacy groups and scholars of 
various disciplines working to deliver timely and purpose-specific information on coastal risk, 
adaptation policy, and evolving migration dynamics.  
###Word count: 2722 
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Fig. 1. | Migration under sea-level change and policy scenarios. 
Caption: A) presents a framework for evaluating risk of exposure occurring by the year 270 
2050, when global mean sea-level rise is similar under different emission scenarios, based 
on the likelihood of hazards related to sea-level change occurring in any given area during 
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a given year. B) depicts exposure and migration dynamics that may emerge simultaneously 
in this period, their various triggering mechanisms and potential policies that may act as 
intervening factors.  Migration is depicted (arrows) between potential destinations (red 275 
circles, the size of which correspond to rising and falling rates of migration). In the short-
term, policy may simultaneously influence various forms of mobility and migration at sea 
level including: a. short-distance, temporary or seasonal migration, b. urbanization in 
coastal cities, c. permanent migration from rural areas, d. mobility traps, e. prospective 
migration in advance of impacts, f. short-term “climate gentrification” of high-risk areas, 280 
and g. background pro-coastal migration.  C) presents the possibility space for one 
projection of sea-level change under an unspecified emission scenario at the year 2100, with 
associated adaptation interventions and migration outcomes. Areas in flood plains will be 
inundated with increasing frequency (dark orange), and new areas formerly above the 
annual flood plain will experience intensifying risk (orange). Adaptation interventions will 285 
increasingly affect migration dynamics, including: a. the concentration of multiple 
migration flows to fewer safe destinations where coastal fortification and accommodation 
has occurred, b. settlement abandonment where no adaptation interventions have 
occurred, c. community relocation accompanying a strategy of retreat, and d. sudden 
migration as adaptation interventions reach their limits.  290 
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